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In dedicating themselves to shared governance in respect to economic matters, the 
European Union (EU) has been able to maintain peace and stability, in a region affected by two 
devastating world wars, which left pain and destruction in its path. In its earliest form, the 
European Coal and Steel Community held peace and economic stability at the forefront of the 
organization.1 This dedication to peace and economic stability would allow for countries within 
the region to grow from the ashes. In the span of several decades and numerous territorial and 
ideological expansions, the ECSC has become the European Union known today. Becoming the 
largest economy in the world with a collective GDP of $18.7 trillion and generating roughly $22 
trillion in economic output, the European Union has been able to garner large economic power 
within the world.2 With over 64 % of EU countries' total trade is done with other countries in the 
bloc,3 the European Union has had much success with forming a competitive economy while 
securing peace among member states through treaties and multilateral agreements. These treaties 
and agreements have increased the interdependence among member states, and has made war or 
armed conflict virtually impossible.  
Present-day EU stands as a political and economic union between twenty-eight European 
member states prior to the formalization of Brexit. With the implementation of a common 
currency and lowered barriers for movement between national borders, EU residents, capital, 
goods, and technology are able to freely travel between member states, thus increasing the 
                                                        
1 Anonymous. “The EU in Brief.” European Union, 16 June 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-
in-brief_en. 
2 Amadeo, Kimberly. “Why China Is the World’s Largest Economy.” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019. 
3 Anonymous. “The Economy.” European Union, 5 July 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/figures/economy_en. 
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interdependence and strength of the Union. With the motto “United in diversity"4, the EU 
showcases the unity within the bloc, despite the differences in language, customs, and religions 
of many peoples within the European bloc. Or does it? 
Although European Union member states have enjoyed many benefits, there have also 
been a variety of setbacks brought upon by the growing disparities of relative power amongst Eu 
member states. These disparities have caused various member states to become resentful toward 
the EU and become distrusting for plans for further expansion of the EU. One of the most 
publicized examples of these member states is the United Kingdom (UK), which due to its 
discontent with the EU decided to separate from the Union. On Thursday, June 23, 2016, the UK 
government posed the question: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European 
Union or leave the European Union?’5 to the general public in the form of a referendum. After 
counting 26.3 million voting papers and 7.2 million early votes, the UK had spoken: they will be 
enacting Article 50 and breaking away from the European Union. With 52% of the popular vote, 
the movement in favor of leaving the union won the referendum, while 48% of the populace 
voted in favor of remaining a member. With a turnout of 72.2% of UK eligible voters, 
representing more than 30 million people, the results of the electorate were undeniable.6 With the 
ratification of Article 50 on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(UK), the process for the termination of the UK’s membership of the European Union began, 
thus decreasing the number of EU member states to twenty-seven. This was the first time in the 
history of the European Union, a member state has decided to leave the Union. At the time of 
                                                        
4 Anonymous. “The EU Motto.” European Union, 16 June 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/motto_en. 
5 Zaken, Ministerie van Buitenlandse. What Is Brexit? - Government.Nl. 30 Aug. 2018, topics/brexit/question-and-
answer/what-is-brexit. 
6 Clarke, Harold D., et al. Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. Cambridge University Press, 
2017. 
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writing of this paper, the United Kingdom is scheduled to no longer be a member of the EU on 
January 31, 2020. For the purposes of this paper, the UK is assumed to be leaving the Union by 
the selected date in order to prevent the further complication of the debate. 
Much like in the case of the United Kingdom, many other member states, such as Poland, 
Hungary, and Austria, are experiencing increased levels of frustrations toward the EU. Although 
the UK remains the only example in which these frustrations have led to the enactment of Article 
50, a number of political parties have capitalized on these concerns and frustrations. Resentment 
and discontent towards the Union have caused organizations and political parties to argue against 
further EU initiatives and expansions. Current governments of member states such as Poland, 
Hungary, and Austria, have capitalized on the fear of the EU encroaching on national 
sovereignty by using migrants as examples of how the EU does not consider the needs of its own 
member states first. Populist governments use the fear associated with the European Union to 
instill sentiments of nationalism, identitarianism, protectionism, isolationist, sovereignism, 
creating an increasing divide between the European Union and its member states.7 Political 
parties such as the Alternative for Germany Party (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) of Poland, 
the National Rally Party (Rassemblement national, RN) of France, and the Law and Justice Party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) of Poland have utilized the fear of migrants, the loss of national 
sovereignty, and a weak economy to further their agenda and garner more support within the 
country.8 
                                                        
7 Macron, Emmanuel. Sorbonne speech of Emmanuel Macron - Full text / English version. 
http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html. 
Accessed 4 Dec. 2019. 
8 Buras, Piotr, and Josef Janning. Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era. 2018, 
p. 33. 
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In response to these movements, many political figures have publicly supported the 
European Union and endorsed programs that revitalize the movement towards further 
integration. Current President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, for example, gave a 
speech to members of the European community to favor his plan for an increase in levels of 
sovereignty for the EU through the creation of EU sponsored initiatives.9 Within the first few 
minutes of his speech, Macron reminds the member states of the EU’s mission to provide peace 
and economic stability to all its member states. Today’s EU has strayed away from the original 
concept of the EU with its ideas of nationalism and isolationism. Macron argues the European 
Union has for far too long been dependent on other nations, predominantly the United States, for 
things such as security and the creation of a globalized economy. Therefore the European Union 
must make it a priority to finance and develop a common European Union military to expand its 
sovereignty from other global actors.  
The proposal for the creation of a European Union military has sparked a debate within 
the bloc concerning the validity for the need of an EU military. A couple days following 
President Macron’s speech at Sorbonne University, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
pronounced her own support for the plan of a European Union military.10 Since then, the 
governments of Spain, Hungary, and Italy have also expressed their interest in the plan. 
Although there has been a variety of support within the bloc for the creation of a European 
Union army, there are many other member states and political parties/groups that have remained 
neutral or plainly reject the proposed plan.  Even amongst its support, many still debate the 
desired scope of the European Union Military’s jurisdiction. One might expect that the more 
                                                        
9 Macron, Emmanuel. Sorbonne speech of Emmanuel Macron 
10 Merkel, Angela. “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 
November 2018.” Home Page, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/speech-by-federal-chancellor-
angela-merkel-to-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-13-november-2018-1550688. Accessed 4 Dec. 2019. 
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powerful France, Germany, and Spain would be least supportive of the plan because their 
relative costs would be higher, while the border nations that are more likely to enjoy the benefits 
while not sharing the cost, would be most supportive. Yet, this is not the case.  
Member states such as Germany and France are more likely to be in favor of financing 
and developing an EU military due to their higher relative authority within the bloc compared to 
lower-income member states. Although these member states would have to contribute the most 
funding, they would also gain more influence with the bloc’s foreign policy. On the other hand, 
member states with less relative power within the bloc may be more skeptic about the intentions 
of the military and will be less likely to support it. Countries such as Poland, Austria, and 
Hungary, who have all showed signs of nationalistic and Eurosceptic ideologies, are more likely 
to vote against an EU military in order to appease an already frustrated electorate for their 
respective countries. The debate is only further complicated when introducing the nature of the 
EU military. An EU military that works in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is favored more by countries such as Germany, Austria, and Spain while a 
sovereign EU military is supported by countries ensure about the reliability of NATO for 
European Security, such as France, Hungary, and Poland.  
Literature Review 
Since the Great Recession, various member states within the European Union have 
experienced rising sentiments of populism and nationalism. Although more strongly felt in 
border member states such as Poland, Austria, and Hungary, these nationalistic and Eurosceptic 
populist movements have sprung up and gained strength in most if not all EU member states.11 
                                                        
11 Camus, Jean-Yves, et al. Far-Right Politics in Europe. Harvard University Press, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/claremont/detail.action?docID=4830748. 
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Authors of the article titled, The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism, for example, 
attribute the rise in the strength of populist leaders to two main reasons.12 The first reason for the 
spread of populist ideologes comes as a response to progressive values, such as cosmopolitanism 
and multiculturalism. Populist leaders are able to capitalize on the fears of losing national 
cultural identity and instill ideas of resentment towards EU and National policies that allow for a 
greater flow of cultural diffusion. The second reason for the rise in populism focuses on 
economic insecurity, which originated from globalization and the transformation of the supply 
chain. Outsourcing, the increased competition from low-wage countries, and automation of 
certain supply chain processes allow for sharp increases in unemployment in Europe. With 
increased levels of migrants due to the instability within the Middle East following the recent 
global financial crisis, many citizens view the migrants as the cause of their economic and 
financial issues. When the European Union allows migrants to settle within the bloc and compete 
for jobs, member states believe the bloc is focused more on the well-being of the migrants than 
the health of the member states’ economies. This disillusionment towards the EU increases the 
resentment and frustrations felt by member states, thus increasing the hesitance for further EU 
expansion to other realms of governance.  
Although it is very important to analyze the importance of an EU military in the current 
political climate, most countries already believe a common defense policy and/or a fully 
functional EU military would be strengthen to the agenda the bloc is trying to peddle. Books 
such as, The European Union as a Global Actor, for example, written by Charlotte Bretherton 
and John Vogler, focus on the European Union’s ambition to become a global actor, which is 
                                                        
12 The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism - ProQuest. https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/2032510490?accountid=10141. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019. 
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suppressed by the lack of institutions directly abled to tackle issues of foreign policy as a bloc.13 
Bretherton and Vogler argue that despite the European Union’s success as an economic power, 
the EU lacks the appropriate institutions and/or set of policies to become an effective actor. 
While the EU has been very successful with the providing development and humanitarian aid as 
well as becoming a leader in green technology and environmental governance, it has lagged 
behind in forming relations with key regional actors such as Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, as well 
as providing a clear Common Foreign and Security Policy in response to more contemporary 
issues such as terrorism and political instability. 
The point of contention for the EU military is the nature of the military within the EU and 
NATO framework. An EU military with higher levels of control within the realm of security and 
defense, which are typically competencies of member states, or more likely to be rejected by 
member states who do not believe the EU does not take their needs in consideration during the 
decision making process. Member states with lower relative power within the bloc, and higher 
levels of Euroscepticism and populism are more likely to be against an EU military due to the 
potential point of contention an expanded EU competence in the field of defense can cause for 
national sovereignty. When making a decision on whether to create an EU military, member 
states essentially have to make a decision between maintaining NATO as the predominant 
defense mechanism within the bloc or whether the EU should create an EU military, independent 
or collaborative with the NATO, that focuses on foreign policy initiatives proposed by the bloc. 
While there has been much research on the advantages of a common defense policy such 
as the CSDP as well as the common EU military proposed by President Macron, few researchers 
have analyzed the effect of national politics and agenda of member states within the EU blocs on 
                                                        
13 Bretherton, Charlotte, et al. The European Union as a Global Actor. Routledge, 2005. www-taylorfrancis-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org, doi:10.4324/9780203022672. 
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the finalized plan of the military institutions. Due to its contemporary and ongoing nature, works 
regarding the European Union defense system are based more on theories of the effects of new 
institutions as well as the expansion of already approved or existing policies and plans. In order 
to best identify the political reasons behind the struggles member states currently, this paper shall 
use books and analytical pieces concerning the needs of proper EU institutions and funding for 
an EU common military, aspects of a successful common militaries, and the EU’s role as a 
global actor, with articles released by European Think Tanks as well as EU and member state 
press releases that are relevant to the defense ambitions in the EU.  
This paper will look at the relationship between a member state’s relative power within 
the EU to the levels of favorability these member states hold towards the creation of a European 
Union military. In doing so, this paper will cover three aspects of the debate concerning the 
creation of the EU military: the development of the current mechanism for the EU’s security and 
defense initiatives, the proposed plan for the European Union Military and its respective points 
of contention, and the variety of positions held by some of the member states. 
Current EU Security Mechanisms 
In order to understand the current structure of the EU security mechanisms, it is 
important to take a look at the steps leading up to the creation of a singular security policy. The 
first incarnation of a common defense mechanism within the European Union came in the form 
of the Western European Union. Although it worked very closely with the European Union, the 
Western European Union remained independent from EU affairs for a majority of its existence. 
Founded in 1948, with modifications to come in 1954, the Western European Union became the 
primary defense mechanism for the European Union until its official closing in 2011 to be 
replaced by the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. Prior to the creation of NATO, the 
 11 
Western European Union provided the initial framework for a European defense policy as well 
as NATO and the Council of Europe. Originally signed created through the Brussels treaty, the 
WEU was first signed by the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United 
Kingdom, and in 1954 would later include West Germany and Italy. Administered by a council 
consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs and of defense of the member countries and headed 
by a secretary-general, the WEU was tasked to assist with economic recovery amongst Western 
European member states, offer mutual military assistance in the case of external aggression, and 
the promotion of unity and integration.  
Although Article 5 would ‘afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power’ and this aid would remain ‘in accordance with the provisions of Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, this power would, later on, be held by NATO to which 
all WEU participating member states also were signees of. Due to NATO’s role as the Defense 
provider to members of the WEU, the council, between 1954 and 1984, became responsible for 
providing a forum for policy formulation and discussions concerning defensive protocols for 
WEU member states in the case of external actors. These policies and discussions oftentimes 
remained focus on the ability for NATO to respond to its defense needs rather than any 
implementation of any WEU policies to prevent or act upon any act of aggression. Unlike the 
European Union who’s jurisdiction within the fields of economic integration and political 
cooperation has grown, the WEU’s jurisdiction remained the same during this time.  
A change in the scope of the WEU would come until the Declaration by the WEU 
Foreign and Defense Ministers, produced in Rome, on October 27, 1984. In this Declaration, the 
WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers announced their decision, “to hold comprehensive 
discussions … on the specific conditions of security in Europe, In particular: … arms control  
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and  disarmament, the effects  of  developments  in East-West  relations  on  the  security  of 
Europe, Europe's  contribution  to  the  strengthening  of  the  Atlantic Alliance [NATO], [and] 
may  also Consider the Implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.”14 With 
this Declaration, the WEU was able to expand its view of a common security policy to a 
European scale as well as the potential for raising concerns pertaining to issues outside the 
region. In 1992, released the Petersberg Declaration created by the WEU Council of Ministers in 
Bonn, Germany. Within the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU introduced a set of criteria for 
WEU military interventions, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, 
and tasks of combat forces for the purpose of peacemaking, later to be known as the Petersberg 
tasks. Although the WEU would be increasing its capabilities, and thus creating direct 
competition with NATO, the WEU in the Petersberg Declaration Reaffirmed its conviction to 
NATO. In the declaration, they state, “the Atlantic Alliance [NATO] is one of the indispensable 
foundations of Europe's security. They [WEU] welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO 
with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic partnership.”15 
The Western European Union saw its first member state expansion in November of 1988, 
with the signing of the Protocol of Accession by the WEU Member States granting Portugal and 
Spain official full membership in March of 1990. In a Declaration released on December 10, 
1991, and ultimately included within the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the Member States of 
Western European Union sent an invitation to all the Member States of the EU, not already 
members of the WEU,  status as an observer or member of WEU, and the European Member 
                                                        
14 Western European Union - Union de l'Europe occidentale. [EN LIGNE]. [Bruxelles]: Union de l'Europeoccidentale, 
[02.08.2002]. Disponible sur http://www.weu.int/index.html. 
15 Western European Union, and Western European Union Council of Ministers (19-06-1992 : Bonn). Petersberg 
Declaration: Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh. Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis. Declaration After the 
Extraordinary Meeting of the Weu Council of Ministers with the States of Central Europe. WEU, 1992. 
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States of NATO to become associate members of WEU.16 In 1994, the WEU was further 
expanded by the creation of an Associate Partner title, for ten European democratic nations to 
become involved in a common European defense organization. During this period of WEU 
expansion, the European Union began included similar clauses into their own treaties. This led to 
the eventual absorption of the WEU policies into the European Union and the WEU’s formal 
shut down on June 30, 2011. 
Prior to the absorption of the Western European Union policies into the European Union 
treaties, the EU’s expansion of competencies led to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam by 
all EU member states. Under the guise of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union was 
able to expand its competencies to include foreign affairs and defense policies. Influenced by the 
WEU’s Petersberg Tasks, the EU was able to increase incorporate clauses that would allow the 
EU to intervene militarily in response to peacekeeping and humanitarian concerns. The inclusion 
of these tasks into the treaty became known as the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Within the Treaty of Amsterdam, it states, “The common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy…which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council 
so decide” thus setting the foundations for the eventual creation of the Common Security and 
Defense Policy used in the EU currently. 
During the Franco–British Summit held in St. Malo on December 3rd and 4th of 1998, 
between the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and then-President Jacques Chirac of France., 
the leaders furthered talks about the EU’s role in a European defense mechanism. The 
declaration affirms the need for the EU’s ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
                                                        
16 Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement on JSTOR. https://www-jstor-
org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/761098#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed 8 Dec. 2019. 
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military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.’17 Although important, the two leaders also allude to WEU’s ineffectiveness. 
The declaration states, “Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the 
European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence 
Ministers).” Rather than having a duplication in competences between the WEU and EU, which 
is an inefficient use of resources, WEU policies should be implemented within the EU through 
preexisting institutions. These points set the stage for the conversation held one year later during 
the European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany.  
The European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany, marked one of the largest 
expansion the EU rolled out within the field of defense and security. During the council meeting, 
the member states agreed upon the use of military intervention (the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) independent of NATO as well as the creation of institutions to help with the 
implementation of such policies. The CFSP would require, the EU’s General Affairs Council in 
conjunction with the Defense ministers of each member states if needed, to hold regular 
meetings in order to discuss manners that concern the security of the bloc or any ongoing 
military intervention. Additionally, the CFSP allowed for the creation of a ‘permanent body in 
Brussels, the Political and Security Committee), which consists of representatives with political 
and/or military expertise, an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives 
making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; a EU Military Staff including 
                                                        
17 Joint Declaration on European Defence. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3-4 
December 1998. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, [12.08.2008]. 
Disponible sur http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=News&id=2244063. 
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a Situation Centre; [and] other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security 
Studies.’18 
Although the European Union’s policies were intended for further EU integration in the 
area of foreign affairs and security, the European Council meeting aimed to guarantee 
protections on member states’ sovereignty as well as outline important principles for the 
successful creation of a common security and defense policy. In order to guarantee all member 
states have complete control over the levels of participation within any given intervention 
initiative which uses military force, the EU reserves the right for member states to indicate 
whether they would like to participate in the initiative and when they would like to deploy the 
military assistance. Anticipating further EU initiatives toward integration in the field of defense 
and security, the European Council created a list of principles deemed necessary for the creation 
of the Common Defense and Security Policy, as well. These five principles would mark the 
cornerstone of the present-day defense mechanism within the EU. These principles include the 
equal participation of all EU member states as well as non-allied members; the creation of an 
arrangement with European NATO members to ensure the fullest possible involvement in EU 
led initiatives, and thus building on the pre-existing arrangements held under the jurisdiction of 
the Western European Union (WEU); the guarantee that all participating member states on an 
operation/initiative hold equal rights and protections on the ground as well as in the decision 
making process such is the case in the Council level; the need for a clear method of effective 
mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU; the ability for 
WEU Associate Partners to be involved in EU operations. 
                                                        
18 Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Annex III. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: [06.06.2003]. Press: 0 Nr:150/99. 
Available on http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/. 
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In order to carry out an operation, the participating member states in an operation would 
be dependent on the use of national command structures or preexisting multinational command 
structures within the EU to organize and deploy the military aid. Due to the EU’s lack of 
institutions capable of organizing and deploying military forces, the EU arranged an agreement 
with NATO that would allow for the use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU led missions in 
the case member states would not be able to organize the military force in a member’s command 
structure. In a series of negotiations with NATO, finalized in 2003, the EU and NATO worked a 
plan for the use of NATO assets for EU led operations known as the Berlin Plus Agreement. The 
Berlin Plus Agreement allowed for the use of NATO planning capabilities by the EU for EU led 
civilian and military operations under the condition both parties agree on a NATO-EU Security 
Agreement to exchange classified information under reciprocal security protection rules; a set 
procedure for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; terms of 
usage for the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe; a system for EU-NATO consultation 
during EU-led operations that make use of NATO assets and capabilities; and a plan for the 
reinforcement of military and civilian capabilities that may be required during operations led by 
the EU.19  
It would only take a few months for the defense policies of the EU to be placed put to the 
test. With the start of the US’ intervention in Iraq, questions over the EU’s role in the 
intervention efforts of the US and UK rose within the bloc. Division within the EU made it clear 
for the need of a common strategic vision to maintain unity amongst the member states.20 As a 
                                                        
19 Joint press statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, 3 June 2003, summarizing progress 
made in NATO-EU cooperation since the joint Declaration of 16 December 2002 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-056e.htm 
20 “Iraq War | Summary, Causes, Combatants, & Facts.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War. Accessed 8 Dec. 2019. 
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response to this indecision, the European Council adopted a policy named ‘A Secure Europe in a 
Better World’ as the main piece of the European Security Strategy. This security policy looked 
towards a multilateral approach to addressing the key threats to EU security which included 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime.21 The European Security Strategy (ESS) would call for the use of multilateral 
organizations such as the UN and regional organizations as the first line of defense against 
possible breaches in safety. The use of violence would be the last resort option, due to the fear of 
causing further instability within the region, such was the case with Iraq. In response to the 
concerns brought by the ESS, the EU enacted a neighborhood policy which called for the 
increase of security protocols in ‘the EU’s neighborhood’ which includes the Balkans, Southern 
Caucasus, and the general Mediterranean region.22 With the EU’s increased capacity to intervene 
and a growing fear of violence, EU member states believed it in their best interest to intervene as 
a global actor in a responsible and multilateral fashion.   
 The current form of the EU defense mechanism comes in the form of the Common 
Security and Defense Policy, introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon sets a 
very important structure to the already complex organization known as the European Union. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty did not extend the number of exclusive competences the EU has, it 
does provide an alternative to how power is exercised within the Union to increase the levels of 
citizen participation and transparency. Specifically, in the realm of EU security and defense, the 
Lisbon Treaty condenses the past 20 years of EU policies regarding security while adding 
                                                        
21 European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-
europe-better-world/. Accessed 8 Dec. 2019. 
22 Joint press statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, 4 December 2003, summarizing 
progress made in NATO-EU cooperation since the Madrid meeting, 3 June 2003 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-153e.htm 
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important institutions, under a singular policy known as the Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP). The CSDP would add a clause that guarantees mutual assistance and solidarity in 
the case of external aggression towards a member state, a framework for an eventual Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), expansions of Petersberg Tasks, and the creation of a 
European External Action Service (EEAS) to be overseen by the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
In Section 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU sets the provisions for the 
Common Security and Defense Policy. It begins with the main purpose of the CSPD which is to, 
‘provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The 
Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.’23 These same missions must also be compatible with previously agreed-upon 
arrangements with NATO, due to its importance in the implementation of various military and 
civilian operations. The responsibility for proposing an initiative falls upon the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or a Member State, but it is 
exclusively the High Representative’s duty to propose the use of national resources and EU 
capabilities. Reasons for intervention can range between, ‘joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and 
post-conflict stabilization.’  
The treaty also acknowledges the need for a European Defense Agency, tasked with 
identifying operation requirements, the promotion of measure that will satisfy these operation 
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requirements, contribute to the strengthening of the industrial and technological base sector in 
relation to the EU’s military capabilities, and identifying a cohesive European capabilities and 
armaments policy. Although open to all member states, participation in the European Defense 
Agency is optional. Currently, the European Defense Agency creates and manages a variety of 
institutions and policy agendas, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), European Defense Fund (EDF), the 
Capability Development Plan (CDP), and other key capability programs.  
Although the Lisbon Treaty adds more capabilities to the CSDP, it also maintains many 
of the original goals and institutions. Under the solidarity clause, for example, states, “the Union 
and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if an EU Member State is the 
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.”24 Likewise under the 
Treaty on European Union, ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.’25 By 
including these two clauses into the treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon is able to guarantee a mutual 
assurance amongst member states, seen since the formation of the WEU. This clause though is 
subject to the caveat that any policy enacted by the EU be consistent with the commitments 
already agreed upon under NATO. 
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Plan for an EU Military 
Thanks to the incredible progress made in preventing armed conflict between member 
states, the European Union has been able to concentrate its efforts on improving the standard of 
living for regions within the bloc as well as become a global actor. The EU’s ambitions to 
become a stronger member of the global scene have led the bloc to invest in multiple fields of the 
economy. The EU is a world leader in the sourcing of green energy and the EU is the largest 
contributor of foreign aid in the world. In recent years, the EU has made substantial investments 
in the field of security and defense. Despite such investments, various leaders around the bloc 
has expressed their interest in a common military. 
Origins for the creation of an EU military date prior to even the conception of the 
European Union, and yet only recently has it become seriously debated within the block due to 
the changes in the global political climate. In a speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 
Defense and Security Conference Prague titled, In defense of Europe, President Junker 
elaborates on the need of an EU military. These sentiments would later be echoed with President 
Emmanuel Macron’s speech at Sorbonne University. Cries for an EU military are centered 
around one idea. In President Juncker’s speech he says,  
“A stronger Europe on the global scene: a Union further developing existing 
partnerships, building new ones and promoting stability and prosperity in its immediate 
neighborhood to the east and south, but also in the Middle East and across Africa and 
globally; a Union ready to take more responsibilities and to assist in creating a more 
competitive and integrated defense industry; a Union committed to strengthening its 
common security and defense, also in cooperation and complementarity with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account national circumstances and legal 
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commitments; a Union engaged in the United Nations and standing for a rules-based 
multilateral system, proud of its values and protective of its people, promoting free and 
fair trade and a positive global climate policy.”26 
President Juncker speaks to the ambitions of many within the EU and speaks upon what can be 
possible. Although the EU’s ambitions are to become a global actor, President Juncker 
recognizes the need for the EU member states to honor current agreements and the need for 
collaboration with the international community for peace. The EU does not have to act alone in 
the promotion of peace but rather would work most effectively but organizations such as NATO 
and the United Nations. President Juncker argues, “NATO has been and will remain the 
cornerstone of European security for decades. We are different but we complement each other in 
so many ways – not least by the fact that we share 22 members. Competition between the EU 
and NATO is not an option.”27 Although the idea of an EU military has been tossed around, the 
question remains; what does this European Union Military look like? 
The proposed plan for a European Union Military would make some key changes to the 
way in which the EU is able to mobilize military forces. Under the current European Union 
defense policy, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), grants the right for member 
states to opt into any military action. When a moment arises in which the EU must intervene with 
military force, a meeting among the European Council members is set and any willing 
participants provide the resources for the military force to operate. This military force is created 
for a singular purpose, and once the task has been completed, the force is disbanded until another 
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intervention is required. Due to the EU’s lack of military infrastructure to coordinate and 
mobilize an EU military force, the bloc is dependent on NATO logistical and operational 
purposes. Although the EU will be less dependent on NATO, most member states believe the EU 
military should maintain its close relationship with NATO. The EU will continue to respect the 
previously agreed upon treaties but will create a system in which the EU will be able to mobilize 
an operation free of any international actor.  
The EU Military proposed by President Macron, allows for the creation of a well-funded 
European Defense Fund, a clear decision-making institution, a European chain of Command 
based in a civilian-military headquarters, and the development of a common defense planning 
system. The creation of the European Defense Fund would allow for the investment in the 
military of a united military force as well as continued research and development of new 
technologies in the field of security and defense. A clear decision-making institution would 
provide the EU military the necessary structure and member state input in matters of foreign 
affairs. A European chain of Command based in a civilian-military headquarters would allow the 
organizing of the EU military centered around a specific area with a specific structure resembling 
national militaries. The development of a common defense planning system would allow for the 
development of key capabilities needed for an EU military such as gathering intelligence and 
discussions on tactical decisions.  
In order to create an effective EU military, the EU would need to agree upon a Common 
Defense Budget. It is very simple. In order for there to be a military, there must be funding for 
the EU military to function. In the current system of funding in which member states who are 
interested in pursuing a military or civilian intervention abroad would have to opt into the EU 
task force and pay the necessary allocated costs to the member state, which has caused a growing 
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reluctance to participate in the task forces. The creation of a common fund built into the annual 
allocations for EU funding would allow the countries to not worry about finances when deciding 
on whether to engage in a military or civilian intervention. The first steps in creating this budget 
have already been taken. With the upcoming renewal of the Multi-annual Financial 
Framework(MFF) for 2021-2028, the opportunity to push for more investment in the field of 
security and defense has allowed the EU to look towards the future and allocate funds to cover a 
European defense Budget. Currently, the MFF for the period 2021-2028, allows for the 
distribution of EU funds to three different areas. The first worth €13 billion over the span of 
seven years is the European Defense Fund, followed by a credit line allocated to “military 
mobility” worth €6.5 billion over the seven years, and the European Peace Facility worth €10.5 
billion over the span of the seven years. 28 
With a larger funding the EU would be able to fund the acquisition of common 
capabilities by the EU, for example an investment in infrastructure, with new bases, testing 
centers, research centers designed for use on the EU scale, the connection of EU military 
institutions through a completed communication network, as well as any military project more 
efficiently run by a collective EU military. By investing in connectivity of the European Union 
through the credit line allocated to “military mobility”, member states with external EU borders 
and/or recently targeted member states through acts of aggression or terrorism will be able to 
receive help in a much fast and efficient manner. Member states with external EU borders are 
more likely to receive funds for the creation of bases and military units to safeguard the borders 
from any aggression. With the rise of Russian influence in eastern European counties like 
Ukraine, the need for a strong military presence in the area has become more important. 
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Although many of these member states would have the support of NATO, the EU community 
may be better equipped with knowledge to participate in any intervention.  
In order to pay for these funds, the EU can do one of two things: increase the amount of 
revenue collected from all member states or decrease the funding in one sector to make up for 
investment placed into the common defense budget. Whether to decrease the amount of funding 
allocated to other projects or to increase the revenue gathered from member states, certain 
member states shall take a larger burden for the cost of the EU military.  
To pay for the Common defense fund, the EU have to either increase the cost duties paid 
though imports, increase the Value Added Tax, or increase the rate of national contributions. The 
first source of income comes in the form of duties. When products from a country not a member 
of the Customs Union, they are charged with common customs tariffs. Since the European Union 
does not have a money collecting organization, individual member states are responsible in 
collecting the appropriate common customs tariffs on incoming goods from non-EU countries at 
all points of entry in the Union. The money collected by the individual countries are then sent 
directly to the Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.29 Once they have reached 
Brussels, 20% of all the tariffs collected by each country are granted to each member state to 
cover the cost of collection.30 In 2015, the EU’s revenue from customs duties is estimated to be 
nearly 18.6 billion euros, making up 12.7 % of its total revenue.31 
The second source of income comes in the form of a Value Added Tax. A value-added 
tax, or VAT, is a tax imposed at each stage of a product’s the supply chain, from production to 
the point of sale at every point where there has been an increase in a value of the good. This 
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value-added tax is paid by the residents of each member state within in the European Union. It 
effects not only the consumers who purchase goods for consumption, but also good 
manufacturers who purchase products in order to create goods. In 2015, the European Union’s 
total revenue from the Value Added Tax on its own resource was estimated to be at nearly 18.1 
billion euros, making up 12.4 % of total revenue. 
The third and final source of income for the European Union comes in the form of a 
national contribution based on the gross national income (GNI) of each individual member state. 
The national contributions are a way for the EU to cover the remainder of the costs associated 
with EU functions, therefore the annual amount of national contributions varies for each fiscal 
year. These national contributions are derived from annual member state budgets, therefore each 
member state is responsible for collected their own taxes and allocating the specified amount of 
the European Union. Today, the national contributions from each member state represent the 
largest source of income for the European Union. In 2015, the European Union collected roughly 
around 101 billion euros in national contributions which represented 69.14 % of the bloc’s total 
revenue. 
By increasing the rate of at least one of the aforementioned methods of revenue collection 
for the European Union, the main contributors of the budget are disproportionately affected. The 
main contributors to the budget are naturally the larger and richer member states. Over 70% of 
the budget comes from five states: Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain.  Due to their 
overall size and economic strength, residents of these nations are the most likely to offset the 
cost of the Common Defense Budget. Residents of these countries are more likely to purchase 
imported and/or manufactured goods due to the higher standards of living and easier access to 
capital. These member states are also the largest producers of manufactured goods in the bloc. 
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Increased tax rates can cause prices for manufactured goods such as cars and clothing to go up 
thus causing less residents around the EU to purchase the goods. Although different increased 
rates have a variety effect on the economy, any increase in the rate of revenue collection would 
hurt the pockets of the residents in larger and stronger economies, thus decreasing the possibility 
for countries such as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy to support this increase. This is further 
offset with the UK’s decision to leave the EU, creating a deficient in the budget already being 
alleviated by member states such as Germany and France.  
A rise in the revenue collection would affect all member states since every member state 
imports good and produces manufactured goods sold within the Union. The concern arises in the 
unequal pressure placed upon the member states. An unequal pressure is when A general 
increase in the price of goods in member states such as France and Germany can lead to the 
strengthening of populist movements within the country. Parties such as the National Rally (RN) 
in France and the Alternative for Germany (Afd) rally around the resentment and frustrations 
concerning the EU. Increasing the price of goods would increase the concern of an already 
skeptical opposition. Marine Le Pen, for example, candidate for French president in the last 
French election ran on a platform who’s foreign policy centered around the renegotiate of all the 
European treaties within six months of her presidency. After the period of six months, the French 
people on whether to accept or reject the newly negotiate terms. Le Pen also believed in a 
withdrawal from the euro and the Schengen Agreements as well as the rejection of all free trade 
accords.  
In the case all member states are not able to agree on a way in which the EU can increase 
its revenue, the EU is able to redirect funds away from some programs and/or initiatives to the 
Common Defense Fund. Spending within the European Union is determined by the Multiannual 
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Financial Framework (MFF). The MFF is a seven-year fiscal budget that sets annual limits for 
EU spending and allocates money to a variety of different funds and initiatives. The MFF is 
organized by fiscal years, with each year presenting the funding allocation of five categories, 
also known as headings. These headings correspond to groupings of EU priorities and areas of 
action related to EU functions.  Currently, the European Union is operating under the 2014-2020 
MFF member states are in negotiations for the creation of the 2021-2027 MFF, allowing the 
possibility of an increase in the budget for defense spending.  
As of the current 2014-2020 MFF, most of the EU budgetary spending is dominated by 
two headings which include the Smart and inclusive growth as well as the Sustainable growth of 
natural resources. Smart and inclusive growth aims to increase levels of efficiency in regards 
though enterprise and development, by increasing the funding of projects that help with the 
transfer and transportation of information, goods, services, and labor. The Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF), for example, helps increase the levels of connectivity amongst member states by 
investing in the field of energy production, facilitation of transportation (terrestrial, aerial, and 
martial), as well as common telecommunication systems. In order to help the less developed 
regions within the Union, the EU has set a substantial sum of capital towards the funding of the 
Cohesion policy. Cohesion policy involves regional and social policy activities of a redistributive 
nature. Least developed nations have access to these funds to increase economic competitiveness 
and eventually growth. The Metro system in Warsaw, for example, was funded by EU capital 
through cohesion policies in order to better assist Poland with infrastructural investment. 
Sustainable growth of natural resources, on the other hand, tackles the need to create a 
stable agricultural and rural economic and social environment. The Common Agricultural Policy, 
for example, aims to secure a stable standard of living for farmers as well as ensure a safe and 
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stable food supply for the bloc. Throughout European history, the continent endured cycles of 
famine brought upon crop failures. The Common Agricultural Policy has created a safety net for 
those dependent on crop yields as well as ensuring the food shortage is mitigated through the 
exchange of crops from one region within the EU bloc to another. This has helped Europe 
become increasingly agriculturally independent and self-sustainable in case of a famine or crop 
failure. In recent times, due to the success of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the rising 
concern of climate change, the EU has switched from self-sufficient to more environmentally 
friendly focused agricultural initiatives. The Programme for the Environment and Climate 
Action, for example, aim to restore lost ecosystems within the EU due to mal agricultural 
practices and sponsor a more environmentally friendly agricultural framework, best suited for the 
producers. 
Although Smart and inclusive growth and the Sustainable growth of natural resources 
make up roughly around 73 percent of the total EU budget, there is still a substantial amount of 
funding directed towards initiatives concerning, Security, citizenship, justice, and a more Global 
Europe, as well as the overall cost of administering the entirety of the European Union. Unlike 
with the case of increasing the rate of revenue in the EU, a redirecting of funds from pre-existing 
plans and funds, would disproportionately the poorer and/or less developed member states who 
are in greater dependence of Cohesion funding allocations which make up a total of one-third of 
the entire budgetary expenditure. Cohesion funding, which is granted to EU member states with 
a Gross National Income (GNI) of less than 90% of the EU average, is designed to help member 
states become more economically competitive. Investments in infrastructure and technology, 
allow for these member states to increase the likelihood for companies and manufacturers to 
make the move to the member states thus further stimulating growth in their respective 
 29 
economies. By decreasing spending such as with the Cohesion Funding, many of these member 
states will not be able to pay for certain investment projects, thus increasing resentment towards 
the EU. 
Although there will be a decrease in the levels in spending in programs such as the 
Cohesion funding, many of the member states that use to receive cohesion funding may find 
other ways to make up for the loss in EU assistance. Leaders of Hungary and Poland, in recent 
years have been vocal about their desire to build up strong militaries in their respective countries. 
An increase in funding for larger security and defense capabilities, would allow member states 
like Hungary and Poland to expand their national military capabilities. As EU member states 
with external EU borders, the security of these member states is a matter of security for the entire 
Union. The strengthening of security around the external EU borders with the use of EU 
resources, although contradictory to the policies and rhetoric implemented the populist 
movements within these countries, is supported by Poland and Hungary.  
Once the matter of funding is resolved, the European Union would need an organization 
tasked with providing judgement on whether to engage in an intervention. Within the current 
defense policy, the decision to intervene militarily or through civilian task forces relies heavily 
on the European Council. In order to intervene under the guise of the EU, there must be 
unanimity in favor of the intervention. If unanimity is not reached the plan to intervene fails. On 
the other hand, if the European Council votes hold a unanimous vote in favor of the plan, 
member states interested in participating in the intervention are then allowed to organize the 
course of action. If needed the member states are allowed to use NATO assets in order to better 
implement the plan for intervention. Based on the preferences of the various member states, the 
process for decision making may stay the same or be changed. Most if not all member states are 
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inclined to maintain the current phrasing of the treaties. Currently, there are no proposals for the 
reformation of the decision-making process. There are though debates on NATO’s role within 
the decision making role.  
Once the decision-making process has been approved, the EU would need to work on the 
operation capacity of the EU military. Currently, the EU is highly dependent on NATO for 
commander centers and the organization of an intervention. Although the Common Defense and 
Security Policy, reserves the right for member states to host a militaristic or civilian task force in 
a member states’ military complexes, infrastructure and policy constraints prevent many member 
states to host their task forces. Instead, NATO hosts these organizations in order to better equip 
the task force. Under the proposal for an EU military, the EU would be responsible for creating 
the necessary structural plans to increase its capability to host larger task forces. In President 
Macron’s speech to the European community at Sorbonne University, he affords to host the EU’s 
military operation within the French military institutions. Although a good temporary fix to the 
lack of institutional support for an EU military, the EU will invest in the creation of 
infrastructure meant to hold the EU’s military capability. Creating this infrastructure will not 
only make help the EU become more independent in terms of  
With sustainable funding, a decision-making organization, and an operations 
infrastructure, the EU would be able to operate military and/or civilian intervention task forces, 
independently from other non-EU actors. Although the EU would have a common be able to 
assemble and manage a common military, an investment in the industrial capabilities within the 
bloc would prove to be advantageous to a developing EU military. In a Speech by President 
Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defense and Security Conference Prague in regards to the defense 
mechanisms of Europe, President Juncker points out the inefficiencies in defense spending 
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within the EU compared to similar global actors such as the United States.  In this speech, 
President Juncker states, “There are 178 – as the Prime Minister said – different weapon systems 
in the EU, compared to 30 in the U.S. We allow ourselves the luxury of having 17 different types 
of combat tanks while the United States is able to manage perfectly well with just one model.” 
By coordinating efforts in the production of military related supplies, the EU would be able to 
produce higher quantities of high quality supplies, thus leaving extra funding for research and 
development of new technologies, for example in the fields of anti-missiles capabilities and air to 
air refueling of military aircrafts.  
With the EU’s diverse manufacturing capabilities as well as the creation of more 
industries in regions of the EU not yet industrialized, the EU would be able to produce goods in a 
more efficient way while benefiting the manufacturing sector of industrial member states and 
increase the possibility of industries to spring up in less industrial member states. While the 
creation of a European Defense Budget will not replace a member state’s national spending on 
the military and security initiatives, the European Defense Budget will allow member states the 
freedom to investment more funds into research and development.32 Countries such as France 
and Germany who already have strong military capabilities, would be able increase the amount 
of funding for research and development. Countries with less developed militaries such as 
Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, would be able to invest more into their respective 
militaries. Although many member states would be able to increase their levels of spending on 
research and development, poorer and less developed member states would benefit the most from 
higher levels of coordination amongst member states because this can allow industries not yet 
developed to be created within these member states. 
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Although many of these member states, currently hold skeptical views toward the EU, 
investments within these member states may help mitigate these skeptical views. Many populist 
leaders feed from the frustrations held by the belief the EU is not helping them prosper. Instead 
policies such as increasing asylum intake in every member state, are viewed as harmful to the 
economies of these member states. By increasing the amount of funding funneled into these 
member states, residents of these member states are more likely to embrace further integration 
policies and expansion initiatives.  
Internal EU Military Debate 
 Since the release of plans for the creation of the European Union military, many leaders 
from around the EU have expressed either their support, rejection, or neutrality regarding the 
plan.33 These views are greatly affected by the position the member state holds within the 
European Union and its respective effects on the member state’s internal political developments. 
Thanks to much debate, many of the position held by member states have changed since the start 
of this paper. Reasons for the support or rejection of the EU military range through a variety of 
different principles. 
Cases of Member States in Favor of a EU Military 
One of the most vocal member states, in favor of implementing a European Union Army,  
is France. Under the presidency of current French President Emmanuel Macron, and its position 
as a major actor within the EU, France’s plan to create a EU military ignited a debate within the 
bloc. Quickly various member states pronounced their support, rejection, or neutrality toward the 
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proposal. With the French President, Emmanuel Macron, as the champion for the creation of the 
EU military, France has remained at the forefront. Although the French have been supportive of 
a EU military since the beginning of the EU, French support for the EU military was reignited 
with President Macron’s controversial speech proposing a EU military only a few months after 
being France’s newly elected President. At the start of his Presidential term in May 2017, 
President Emmanuel Macron inherited a France where only 38% of all French citizens polled 
had a favorable view of the European Union.34  
President Macron’s inauguration came at the heels of the defeat of National Rally 
candidate Marine Le Pen for President. Marine Le Pen, who ran on a political platform centered 
around a withdrawal of France from the EU and Eurozone and a native ‘French’ first, was able to 
garner 34% of the popular vote.35 36 President Macron, on the other hand, ran on a platform 
hopeful for further EU integration in the areas of defense as well as a plan to combat terrorism.37 
President Macron’s speech to the European community at Sorbonne University, began the 
transformation of the way in which France views the European Union. In his speech, President 
Macron does not speak about the European Union as a story of success and triumph but rather as 
a story of hope in a more positive future. When referring to ideas of populism and nationalism 
within the bloc, President Macron says, “They reassure us and, I dare say, they could tomorrow 
clinch victory, not because the peoples are gullible! Not because the European idea is dead! But 
because our weakness, blindness or lack of awareness have created the conditions for their 
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victory.”  President Macron recognizes there are flaws within the current state of the EU but that 
does not mean all hope is lost. Europe must be willing to work towards a more unified Europe in 
order to achieve a more unified Europe.  
One of France’s primary reasons for the creation of an independent EU military, is to 
increase the EU’s sovereignty in light of the political and economic changes occurring in the 
world. With the rise of populism in the United States and an increase in the implementation of 
isolationist policies within the United States, the dependence of the EU on NATO has become a 
liability due to NATO’s heavy reliance on the United States for funding and operational support. 
With the election of President Trump, the relationship between the two nations have continued to 
sour. American criticisms regarding European’s involvement in their own security have turned 
into threats directed at any possible future involvement of the US through NATO. In a tweet 
posted July 10, 2018, President of United States, Donald Trump wrote, “Getting ready to leave 
for Europe. First meeting - NATO. The U.S. is spending many times more than any other 
country in order to protect them. Not fair to the U.S. taxpayer. On top of that we lose $151 
Billion on Trade with the European Union. Charge us big Tariffs (& Barriers)!” Roughly an hour 
later, President Trump posts the following: “NATO countries must pay MORE, the United States 
must pay LESS. Very Unfair!”38  President Trump has continuously criticizes the many NATO 
partners for their ‘delinquent’ actions regarding defense spending. In response, President Macron 
the EU should increase its funding for EU led plans towards security and defense in order to 
decrease the bloc’s reliance on the United States, particularly though NATO. President Trumps, 
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continued isolation and protectionist policies, have led to the souring of relations like with the 
case of France. 
Although NATO resentment remains one of the main motivators for the creation of an 
EU military, it is not the only reasons for French support. The rise of populism within he bloc 
has caused the halt of many integration plans. Even within the confines of the EU exterior 
borders, old sentiments that launched the world wars, such as nationalism, protectionism, 
isolationism, are being reinvigorated by populist movements. These movements feed on the 
feeling of resentment. For many residents of member states part of the EU, policies enact in all 
member states may have caused an unequal balance of power amongst member states. President 
Macron argues, a more integrated EU will decrease the amount of resentment felt towards the 
EU. Although the bloc has made many positive steps toward integration, negative sentiments 
regarding the bloc have become to take traction among many member states. “It is so much 
easier to never explain where we want to go, where we want to lead our people, and to remain 
with hidden arguments, because we have simply lost sight of the objective."39 
France has also expressed its desire, for the EU to become a global actor. Although the 
EU has made many strides toward a stronger economy and financial services, the EU still lacks 
legitimacy in regards to its military strength. In his speech at Sorbonne University, President 
Macron compares the same Sorbonne University to the EU. Much like Sorbonne University, the 
European Union did not start off similar to its present day incarnation, but rather as an idea 
supported by only a handful of leaders. Over time the fundamental ideas for these organizations 
grew in scope and notoriety, soon becoming an idea supported by most people. Sorbonne 
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University and the European Union have garnered a high stature and strength, not because they 
started off with this recognition, but rather because it has been cultivated and nourished over 
time. In order for the EU to garner the recognition it desires, it must begin to create a force 
designed to intervene for the stability and safety of civilians.  
The creation of an EU military would also allow for the expansion of French military 
capacities and an increase of spending for the purpose of research and development of new 
technologies and capabilities. By increasing the levels of investment in research and 
development, France would be able to gain an upper hand in the trading and production of newer 
technologies. As a member state with an already large economy, large deposits of raw materials, 
and a large supply of labor, France would be able to produce many supplies for the EU military 
and other EU member states, thus expanding the reach of French goods within the bloc. By 
opening up new markets in the military industry, France would be able to expand its economic 
influence through the EU military.  
Although Germany disagrees with the need for the EU to become completely free from 
NATO, Germany is in agreement on the need for a EU military. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, in 2017 President Donald Trump is not one the European community can rely upon, 
therefore a greater share of the burdens regarding security and defense shall fall on the backs of 
the European community. Much like France, Germany’s large economy and ability to produce 
military grade weaponry, increases the amount of investment Germany can pour into research 
and development. Although Germany would like to increase the amount of economic transaction 
through the sell of military supplies can bring to the country’s economy, Germany has also taken 
a stand against the sell of weapons to non-EU actors. Similar sentiments are shared by member 
states such as Spain and recently Italy. 
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Cases of Member States Against a EU Military 
Unlike Germany and France, the plan for the creation of a EU army, has garnered the 
rejection of some member states with weaker and/or smaller economies with some being led by 
Eurosceptic populist leaders. Member states such as Poland has expressed its rejection for the 
EU military, in favor of creating closer ties with the United States. The reasons for a polish 
rejection to the creation of a EU military can be explained with three reasons: Poland has been 
unable to reform its domestic defense industry; the existence of an overwhelming preference for 
closer relationships with the US in the fields of defense and security; and the lack of an industrial 
strategy.40 
In the initial period after Poland’s ascension to a full member of the EU, Poland was very 
eager to catch up in strength to fellow EU member states such as France and Germany. In the 
realm of security and defense, Poland was very excited to join the other EU member states in 
further defense integration, becoming one of the first member states to propose a common 
defense mechanism, along with France and Germany. This all took a spin for the worst, when in 
2015 the Polish citizens elected a new government. This new PiS run government, would 
separate itself from other members and would fight against continued EU integration. 
Winning under an Eurosceptic agenda, the PiS became the primary party in Poland. 
Views of unilateralism and nationalism within Poland were only strengthened with the rise of 
President Donald Trump. President Trump’s emphasis on unilateralism and the need for strong 
nationalist narratives, only justified and strengthened these ideas in Poland. The PiS used the 
migration crisis and the EU’s asylum intake to justify the evils of integration many in the PiS 
party focused on. Poland’s lower relative power and the forceful intake of migrants in a country 
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not equipped to take in migrants raised the resentment towards the EU. Any further integration 
would be met by a Polish veto including the common defense mechanism proposed alongside 
France and Germany.  
Expected Outcome 
Although the European Union has gained a significant amount of support since it was 
first announced, the path to the full implementation of the EU military is far away. In order for 
the creation of infrastructure for the EU military to start, the EU would need to approve the 
European Defense Fund as well as vote unilaterally on the creation of such institutions. Although 
many member states have decided to support initiatives to create the EU military, the EU must 
vote unanimously for any furthering of any initiative to pass. Countries like Poland need to be 
convinced the adoption of a common defense mechanism such as the EU military would work to 
all the member states’ advantage.  
Despite providing facts regarding the benefits of adopting the EU military as the primary 
form for EU defense, member states such as Poland may never approve the military. Populist 
movements, such is the case with Poland, depend on the resentment and frustrations felt but its 
citizens to rise to power. Once in power, these populist governments, continue to perpetuate fear 
in policies that will prevent the further spread of EU regulations onto the member state’s system 
of law. In doing so, the populist leaders will have gained control of the government as well as 
secured the continuation of the hold through fear of the EU. Knowing this, the EU military may 
be more difficult to implement. Policies that lead to the implementation of a full EU military 
under the sole direction of EU institutions, have been placed in motion. Major investments in 
military capabilities through the European Defense Fund, for example, allow for the investment 
in the construction in bases capable of holding EU sized military forces.  
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Although it may seem difficult to create the EU military at the moment, it does not 
discount the fact, the EU military can be created within the next 60 years. Like Macron said in 
his speech to the European community at Sorbonne University: “ 
Europe, too, is an idea. An idea supported for many centuries by pioneers, 
optimists and visionaries, and it is always up to us to claim it for our own. Because the 
best ideas, those which drive us forward, which improve people’s lives, are always 
fragile. And Europe will only live through the idea that we have of it. It is our 
responsibility to bring it to life, make it ever better and stronger, to not stop at the form 
that historic circumstances have shaped it into. Because this form may change, but the 
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